Along with my colleague and friend Yossi Nehushtan, I recently had a paper accepted for publication in the journal Jurisprudence. The paper deals with the philosophical grounding for toleration of conscientious objection. Contrary to a common view, we argue that conscientious objections ought not to be tolerated on the basis that they are expressions of autonomous/free choice. Check out the full details below:
Links: Official; PhilPapers; Academia
Abstract: According to the common view, conscientious objection is grounded in autonomy or in ‘freedom of conscience’ and is tolerated out of respect for the objector's autonomy. Emphasising freedom of conscience or autonomy as a central concept within the issue of conscientious objection implies that the conscientious objector should have an independent choice among alternative beliefs, positions or values. In this paper it is argued that: (a) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector has such a choice when they decide to act upon their conscience and (b) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector exercises autonomy when developing or acquiring their conscience. Therefore, with regard to tolerating conscientious objection, we should apply the concept of autonomy with caution, as tolerating conscientious objection does not reflect respect for the conscientious objector’s right to choose but rather acknowledges their lack of real ability to choose their conscience and to refrain from acting upon their conscience. This has both normative and analytical implications for the treatment of conscientious objectors.